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Unfounded Allegations That John Yoo Violated His
Ethical Obligations as a Lawyer: A Critical Analysis of
the Torture Memo
Carrie L. Flores, Esq., SPHR
ABSTRACT
In 2003, John C. Yoo, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, signed
a memorandum issued to the U.S. Department of Defense. This
memorandum provided a legal opinion regarding the standards governing
military interrogations of alien unlawful combatants detained outside of
the U.S. It is now commonly referred to as the “Torture Memo.”
The Torture Memo contained several highly controversial legal
conclusions, including a definition of torture, and although it was
classified information when it was originally issued, the Memo was later
declassified and made available to the public in 2008. The Memo has
been widely criticized ever since. People have blasted it for having no
foundation in any source of law and have criticized John Yoo, claiming
that he violated his legal ethical obligations by authoring the Memo.
Considering the subject addressed in the Memo, the degree of
attention it has received is not surprising. However, to the extent people
have claimed the Memo was completely void of legal foundation and
John Yoo breached his legal ethical obligations in authoring it, these
assertions are unsubstantiated.
This Article analyzes the Torture Memo’s reasoning to show that
Yoo did not violate his lawyerly ethical obligations but instead
produced a thorough legal memorandum supported by a wide variety
of valid legal resources. Accordingly, Yoo should not be condemned
for authoring a memorandum which contained unpopular conclusions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2003, John C. Yoo, 1 then Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel, signed a classified memorandum issued to the United States
Department of Defense. 2 The Department of Defense had requested a
legal opinion regarding the legal standards governing military
interrogations of alien unlawful combatants detained outside of the United
States.3 In response, the Department of Justice’s memorandum, now
commonly referred to as the Torture Memo, concluded that the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution did not extend to
alien enemy combatants detained outside of the United States.4 The
Memo also concluded that certain federal criminal statutes did not apply
to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants.5 Finally, the
Memo interpreted § 2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code—the
statute that makes it a criminal offense for any person outside of the
United States to commit or attempt to commit torture.6 The Memo
concluded that the criminal statutory prohibition against torture did not
apply to interrogations conducted within the United States or on

1. John Choon Yoo received his B.A. from Harvard University and his J.D. from Yale Law
School. Berkeley Law, Faculty Profiles, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/
facultyProfile.php?facID=235 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). Subsequently, he clerked for Judge
Laurence H. Silberman of the United States Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit, joined the
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) faculty (in 1993), clerked for Justice Clarence Thomas
of the United States Supreme Court, and served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of
Legal Counsel at the United States Department of Justice (from 2001 to 2003), where he worked on
issues involving national security and foreign affairs. Id. See also Selected Works of John C Yoo,
http://works.bepress.com/johnyoo/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (detailing numerous scholarly works
authored by John Yoo).
2. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Re: Military Interrogation of
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Torture
Memo], http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf. This memorandum was
originally stamped “SECRET,” but is now marked “UNCLASSIFIED.” Id. It is signed by John C.
Yoo. Id.
3. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1 (“You have asked our Office to examine the legal
standards governing military interrogations of alien unlawful combatants held outside the United States.
You have requested that we examine both domestic and international law that might be applicable to
the conduct of those interrogations.”); see Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorneys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for
OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/best-practices-memo.pdf (setting forth best
practices for opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel and detailing the Office’s “reputation for
giving candid, independent, and principled advice” and its responsibility to issue “clear, accurate,
thoroughly researched, and soundly reasoned” opinions that are “controlling on questions of law within
the Executive Branch”).
4. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1–10.
5. Id. at 1, 11–47.
6. Id. at 1, 32–47.
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permanent military bases outside the territory of the United States. 7
Perhaps in its most widely debated conclusion, after considering a host of
sources, the Memo defined torture as acts inflicting severe pain that result
in “death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions.” 8 On
March 31, 2008, in response to a lawsuit filed by the ACLU, the New
York Civil Liberties Union, and other organizations, the Department of
Justice voluntarily declassified the Torture Memo and made it available to
the public.9
Immediately after the Torture Memo was released, civil libertarians
sharply criticized the conclusions reached in the Memo and the legal
reasoning posited in support of these conclusions. 10 For example, Jack L.
Goldsmith—former Assistant Attorney General for the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, author of The Terror Presidency, and
Harvard law professor 11—blasted the Torture Memo for having “no
foundation” in any “source of law” and containing “one-sided legal
arguments.”12 Yale Law Dean Harold Hongju Koh called the Memo “a
stunning failure of lawyerly craft” and labeled it “a stain upon our law
and our national reputation.”13 Reporters and other commentators
7. Id. at 1–2, 32–47.
8. Id. at 39, 1, 38–47.
9. See id. at 1 (indicating that the Torture Memo was declassified on March 31, 2008); Press
Release, ACLU, Secret Bush Administration Memo Released Today in Response to ACLU Lawsuit
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/34747prs20080401.html [hereinafter ACLU Press
Release] (explaining that the Torture Memo was declassified in response to a Freedom of Information
Act lawsuit initiated in June 2004 by the ACLU and other organizations).
10. See, e.g., ACLU Press Release, supra note 9 (quoting Jameel Jaffer, Director of the
ACLU National Security Project, as criticizing the Torture Memo for its “extremely broad view of the
president’s power as Commander-in-Chief”).
11. Harvard Law School Faculty, Jack Landman Goldsmith, http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/directory/index.html?id=559 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
12. Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memo, NATION, Apr. 9, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/
article/torture-memo (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jack Goldsmith, Jay Bybee’s
successor as head of the Office of Legal Counsel, and characterizing the Memo as “an abysmal piece
of work” that uses “the veneer of legal scholarship . . . to create an aura of legitimacy for near-death
interrogation tactics and unrestrained executive power”); see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY 10 (2007) (“I was astonished, and immensely worried, to discover that some of our most
important counterterrorism policies rested on severely damaged legal foundations.”); see also
Exclusive: “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, ESQUIRE, Apr.
3, 2008, http://www.esquire.com/the-side/qa/john-yoo-responds (quoting John Yoo as responding to
Goldsmith’s characterization of the memo as “slapdash” and poorly reasoned by noting that the Memo
“went through the normal process opinions go through in the Justice Department”).
13. Gillers, supra note 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Exclusive: “Torture Memo”
Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, supra note 12. Critics have alleged that the
Torture Memo was not well-reasoned. See, e.g., id. They have suggested that John Yoo was rushed by
the White House to quickly throw something together and that is what he did. See, e.g., id. Some have
suggested that there was not only time pressure working against Yoo, but that the political pressure to
release a memorandum that would provide maximum flexibility to the President was enormous, and
that Yoo, in releasing the memorandum that he did, was looking out for his own professional career.
See, e.g., id. In an interview shortly after the Torture Memo was declassified and made available to
the public, Yoo denounced these allegations. See id. He explained that the Torture Memo was based
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similarly have condemned the Memo, describing it in disparaging terms;
for instance, one columnist called the Memo “an abysmal piece of
work.” 14 In addition, groups of protestors have picketed the streets to
convey their outrage toward John Yoo, the Torture Memo’s signatory. 15
Web bloggers have also directed hateful messages toward John Yoo,
claiming that Yoo violated his legal ethical obligations by authoring and
signing the Torture Memo. 16
on sound legal principles, citing to relevant statutory text as well as opinions of the Attorney General
and the United States Supreme Court. See id. Yoo furthermore explained that the memorandum took
several months to draft; it was not a legal opinion that was turned around overnight, or even in a few
short weeks. See id. It was thoroughly researched, and it went through the normal process that legal
opinions go through at the Department of Justice: “[i]t was primarily worked on by career staff people,
and then went through a process of editing and review by different offices within the department.” See
id. Finally, regarding political pressure to deliver a desirable memorandum—one with which the White
House would be pleased—Yoo stated,
There wasn’t a lot of back and forth–people would say this is wrong, you need to
delete this. . . . there was no pressure from any other agency from within the
department that the opinion was going too far–or that it wasn’t going far enough. It
was very much hands off. . . . people wanted the [O]ffice[of Legal Counsel] . . . to
take the full responsibility.
Id. See The Torture Question (edited transcript of an interview conducted on July 19, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html. Yoo elaborated on this point in
response to allegations that the Torture Memo was written to achieve political motives,
I just don’t think it’s true. I think [those things are] said by someone who wasn’t
there . . . because a lot of the memos are responses of questions that were asked
before any policies were set. I think people in the government realize[d] that this was
a different war and an unprecedented conflict, and wanted to know what the rules
would be. And you would want the government to do that, or you would want the
government before it set policy to ask questions about what the legal standards were,
rather than saying, “Here’s what we’re going to do, and now write something that
covers us for the future.”
Id. In indicating that the Torture Memo was not written to appease top officials at the White House,
Yoo continued:
I think that it was entirely a good thing that the government asked this question [the
main question asked in the Torture Memo], because as I said, we fight . . . this new
kind of enemy in which intelligence and information is the primary means of
protecting the country. And you get that information through questioning captured
members of the enemy. And what the government wanted to know was what were the
rules that applied to that. I would rather have the government had done it this way
and asked first rather than have decided to interrogate people how they felt like and
then afterward said, “Oh, make sure this is legal.”

Id.

14. Gillers, supra note 12 (claiming the “incompetence” of the authors of the Torture Memo);
see ACLU Press Release, supra note 9 (quoting Jameel Jaffer, describing the Memo as employing “the
same disgraceful legal analysis that was at the root of the CIA’s illegal interrogation program,” and as
saying that if the Memo is believed, “there is no limit at all to the kinds of interrogation methods the
President can authorize”).
15. See, e.g., Jacob Schneider, Protest Targets Law Professor’s Prisoner Memo, DAILY
CALIFORNIAN, June 28, 2004, http://www.dailycal.org/article/15545/protest_targets_law_professor_s_
prisoner_memo (describing a protest relating to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners—before the substance
of the Torture Memo was even available to the public—in which Berkeley law students, opposing the
position asserted by John Yoo in a controversial memorandum dated January 2002, chanted, “John
Yoo[,] you should feel shame, promoting torture in our name”).
16. See, e.g., Grievance Project (Apr. 15, 2008),
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Indeed, the Torture Memo has spawned much debate nationwide.17
To be sure, considering the emotionally charged and hotly controversial
issues addressed in the Memo, the degree of attention it has received is
not surprising. 18 However, to the extent that critics have alleged that John
Yoo violated his legal ethical obligations by authoring the Memo, these
assertions are unsubstantiated.19 Accordingly, the purpose of this Article
is to analyze the reasoning in the Torture Memo, thereby demonstrating
that John Yoo did not violate his ethical obligations as a lawyer in
http://grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/john-yoo/ (originally posted two weeks after the
Torture Memo was declassified, this Web page provides detailed instructions on how to file a
grievance against Yoo in either Pennsylvania or Washington, D.C., or both); John H. Richardson, Is
John Yoo a Monster?, ESQUIRE, May 13, 2008, http://www.esquire.com/features/john-yoo0608?src=rss (noting that John Yoo’s office computer and iPhone screen savers are pictures of his
wife, “which helps take the edge off all the hate calls” he receives).
17. At the time of publication of this Article, this debate continues. In July of 2009, the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) issued a Report, concluding that John Yoo
demonstrated professional misconduct in analyzing the use of interrogation tactics in the Torture
Memo that he authored in 2003, specifically stating, “Yoo knowingly failed to provide a
thorough, objective[,] and candid interpretation of the law.” OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA
CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 251 (2009), http://judiciary.house
.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf. Notwithstanding this Report by the OPR, in
January of 2010, David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney General of the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General, issued his own report, rejecting the conclusion in the OPR’s July 2009
Report, and further noting that the OPR “had given short shrift” in its Report “to the national
climate of urgency in which . . . [John] Yoo acted after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001” (a context
that is significant to consider, albeit difficult to recapture seven years after the fact) especially
considering that the Torture Memo was released shortly after the capture of Abu Zubaydah,
suspected operative for Al-Qaeda. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of
Bush Terror Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html (reviewing the Deputy Attorney
General’s opinion released in February 2010, quoting John Conyers, Jr., House Judiciary
Committee leader, as stating that John Yoo and others “‘dishonored their office and the entire
Department of Justice,’” and also quoting Illinois Senator Richard J. Durbin, stating, “‘Mr. Yoo
may keep [his] law license[], but [he] will not escape the verdict of history’”); Memorandum
from David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen., to
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen.: Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the
Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected
Terrorists (Jan. 5, 2010) (released to the public in Feb. 2010), http://media.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/MargolisMemo_021910.pdf?sid=ST2010021904308.
Lichtblau and
Shane’s article shows that even though the Deputy Attorney General issued its opinion in
February 2010, concluding that John Yoo did not engage in professional misconduct in authoring
the Torture Memo and will not be subject to discipline by the bar for his actions related to
authoring the Memo, people still disagree, and, indeed, the Attorney General’s criminal
investigation of this matter is still underway and is not expected to be completed for several
months. Lichtblau & Shane, supra. The emotional national dispute about how torture is properly
defined and whether John Yoo violated his ethical obligations as a lawyer could be long-lived.
See id.; see also, e.g., supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text (illustrating the controversy the
Torture Memo has spawned).
18. See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.

6

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 25

authoring the Memo. 20
II. BACKGROUND
Before analyzing whether John Yoo violated his ethical obligations by
authoring the Torture Memo, Part II.A of this Article first provides an
overview of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States. Part II.B then explains the Department of Defense’s request for a
legal opinion from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.
Finally, Part II.C sets forth the Torture Memo’s significant findings.

A. The Terrorist Attacks of September 11th and America’s Response
On September 11, 2001, in an unprecedented terrorist attack on the
United States, nineteen Islamist terrorists, believed to be affiliated with
Al-Qaeda, hijacked four United States–operated commercial passenger
airplanes and intentionally crashed them, killing nearly three thousand
people.21 These hijackers, now oft-referred to as suicide bombers, used
these commercial airplanes as guided missiles, aiming the planes at
critical government buildings located in the Nation’s capital and landmark
buildings located for the most part in the heart of the Nation’s financial
district.22 Specifically, they crashed two planes into the Twin Towers of
the World Trade Center in New York City and one plane into the
Pentagon, in Arlington County, Virginia. 23 After some passengers and
the flight crew attempted to retake control of the fourth plane, which the
hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C., this fourth plane
crashed into a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.24
In total, nearly three thousand people lost their lives as a result of
these attacks.25 Numerous buildings located in the World Trade Center
20. See infra Part III.
21. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, 12, 1–46, 552 n.188, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
(describing the events of September 11th as “unprecedented”; referring to the nineteen 9/11 terrorist
hijackers as Islamist extremists; detailing the horrific plane crashes and resulting damage that occurred
on September 11, 2001; reporting that as of July 9, 2004, the 9/11 attacks killed a total of 2973
nonterrorists, and specifying the breakdown of these deaths as follows: the World Trade Center attacks
killed 2749 nonterrorists, the Pentagon attack killed 184 nonterrorists, and the crash of United Airlines
Flight 93 in Pennsylvania killed 40 nonterrorists).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1–10.
24. Id. at 10–14.
25. 9/11 by the Numbers, NYMAG.COM, http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers
.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (reporting that as of September 5, 2002, the total number killed in the
attacks was 2819, and reporting other statistics relating to the attacks of September 11, 2001, including
the number of deaths, the cost of clean-up efforts, costs related to insurance payments issued, and the
number of people who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the attacks); First
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complex and in the surrounding financial district, including those housing
thousands of small businesses, were “dislocated, disrupted[,] or
destroyed,” and much of the Lower Manhattan area near the World
Trade Center was condemned and deemed uninhabitable because of the
toxic conditions caused by the attacks.26 North American air space and
national stock exchanges closed almost immediately after the attacks. 27
Several days later, when air travel resumed and the stock exchanges reopened, air travel within the United States significantly decreased, and the
stock exchanges reported some of the largest financial declines in
history. 28 Overall, destruction resulting from the September 11th terrorist
attacks, including the costs of rebuilding the damaged areas, exceeded
hundreds of billions of dollars.29
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, orchestrated and carried
out by members of Al-Qaeda, constituted an armed attack against the

video of Pentagon 9/11 attack released, CNN.COM, May 16, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/
16/pentagon.video/index.html (reporting that “[t]he Pentagon attack killed 184 people: Fifty-three
passengers and six crew members on board American Airlines Flight 77, and 125 military and civilian
personnel inside the building”); Missing Doctor Added to List of 9/11 Victims, NEW YORK SUN, July
10, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/new-york/missing-doctor-added-to-list-of-9-11-victims/81626/
(reporting that as of July 10, 2008, the number of World Trade Center victims is believed to be
approximately 2751); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, 552 n.188, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report
.pdf (reporting that as of July 9, 2004, the crash of the United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania killed
forty nonterrorists).
26. GAIL MAKINEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 9/11: A RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31617 (Sept. 27, 2002), at CRS-5, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31617.pdf; see Anita Gates, Buildings Rise From Rubble While
Health Crumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at E6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/
11/arts/television/11dust.html?ref=nyregionspecial3 (discussing the “toxic soup”— comprised of
thousands of contaminants—that filled the air in New York City after the September 11th attacks on the
World Trade Center); see also Henry C K Liu, The Towering Challenge of the WTC Project,
ASIA TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at A1, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/
EB12Aa01.html.
27. Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, & Blake Morrison, Amid Terror, A Drastic Decision:
Clear the Skies, USA TODAY¸ Aug. 12, 2002, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/sept11/2002-08-12-clearskies_x.htm; Alexandra Twin, Stocks: 5 Years After 9/11,
CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 11, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/08/markets/markets_
fiveyearslater/index.htm (“Financial markets never opened on Sept. 11, 2001, and remained
closed for the next four trading sessions.”).
28. Bill Barnhart, Markets Reopen, Plunge, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2001, at N1 (noting that
stocks dropped sharply the first day stock trading resumed on Wall Street after September 11, 2001,
causing the Dow Jones to experience its biggest one-day point loss ever); Dipasis Bhadra & Pamela
Texter, Airline Networks: An Econometric Framework to Analyze Domestic U.S. Air Travel, 7(1) J.
TRANSP. & STAT. 87 (2004), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/journal_of_
transportation_and_statistics/volume_07_number_01/html/paper_06/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2010)
(discussing post-September 11th effects on the airline industry); see MAKINEN, supra note 26 at 3–4
(discussing immediate and long-term post-September 11th effects on the airline industry and on the
United States financial system).
29. See generally MAKINEN, supra note 26 (discussing the financial costs resulting from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and noting that New York City’s Gross City Product alone was
reduced by $27.3 billion from October 2001 to December 2002).
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United States, triggering the Nation’s right under both domestic and
international law to use force to defend against future attacks until the
threat posed by Al-Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist organizations
ceased.30 The United States Government responded to this armed attack
by launching what has since been referred to as the War on Terror. 31
Shortly after September 11th, the United States organized a broad
coalition of international forces to eradicate the Taliban regime for
harboring members of Al-Qaeda. 32 Many countries, including Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe, not only launched anti-terrorism
legislation but many also froze the bank accounts of individuals who
were thought to be connected to Al-Qaeda. 33 As part of a wide-scale
attempt to break up militant cells scattered around the world, law
enforcement and intelligence agencies in a number of countries,
including Italy, arrested individuals who were suspected terrorists.34
In October 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which
was aimed at identifying and prosecuting individuals engaged in terrorism
and other similar crimes.35 In addition, the Bush Administration initiated
a secret national security operation which enabled government officials
30. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm (indicating that the United States Government
determined that the attacks of September 11, 2001 constituted an act of war); John C. Yoo & James
C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 209–15 (2003) (discussing whether the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks initiated an international armed conflict, thereby justifying
the use of military force by the United States to subdue and defeat the enemy).
31. See Jide Nzelibe & John C. Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE
L.J. 2512 (2006) (arguing that the constitutional presidential process that is appropriate depends
on the type of regime the United States is combating, and explaining that a unilateral presidential
approach might be appropriate where the United States is involved in a dispute with a terrorist
organization).
32. See U.S. President Bush’s speech to United Nations, CNN.COM, Nov. 10, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/10/ret.bush.un.transcript/index.html (referring to the “coalition
against terror,” just one month after the attacks of September 11, and addressing the need for a
coordinated attack against terrorists and their financial networks); see also Who are the Taliban of
Afghanistan, CNN.COM , http://articles.cnn.com/1996-10-05/world/9610_05_taleban_1_talibanislamic-militia-kabul-islamic-afghanistan?_s=PM:WORLD (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (describing
the Taliban as “imposing a fundamentalist regime guided by their own interpretation of Islamic law”).
33. See 68th IFLA Council and General Conference (August 18–24, 2002),
http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla68/papers/156-079e.pdf (discussing anti-terrorism legislation enacted in
numerous countries worldwide); Kananaskis Summit 2002, G8 counter-terrorism cooperation since
September 11th backgrounder, http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8_documents/archives_
from_previous_summits/kananaskis_summit_-_2002/g8_counter-terrorism_cooperation_since_
september_11th_backgrounder.html (discussing the efforts of over 160 countries and jurisdictions to
freeze assets belonging to terrorists).
34. See, e.g., Courtney C. Walsh, Italian Police Explore Al Qaeda Links in Cyanide Plot,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 2002, World, at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/
0307/p07s02-woeu.html (discussing the arrests of several people allegedly tied to Islamic militant
cells).
35. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 114 Stat. 272, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/lessons/patriotact.pdf.
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“to eavesdrop on telephone and e-mail communications between [people
in] the United States and people overseas without [obtaining] a
warrant.” 36 In November 2001, President Bush signed an Executive
Order, allowing military officials to hold foreign nationals indefinitely,
and soon thereafter, the United States established a detention command
center in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in order to detain illegal enemy
combatants for interrogation.37

B. The United States Department of Defense’s Request for a Legal
Opinion
In January of 2002, the first twenty prisoners from the Afghanistan
battlefield were transferred to the detention center at Guantánamo Bay,
and in the years following, hundreds of prisoners of war were taken
there, and although hundreds of prisoners have also been released, as of
January 2010, approximately 200 inmates still remain.38 This detention
center has received a great deal of attention from the media over the
years and has been the focus of much controversy among the public.39
36. Jim VandeHei & Dan Eggen, Cheney Cites Justifications For Domestic Eavesdropping,
WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2006, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/04/AR2006010400973.html (discussing the Bush Administration’s
communications monitoring operation aimed at allowing government officials to secretly monitor
conversations involving individuals suspected to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda without first obtaining
court orders); see John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV.
793, 812–22 (2004) (discussing the transformation of threats to American national security since
September 11, 2001).
37. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), superseded by Exec. Order No. 13,425, 72
Fed. Reg. 7,737 (Feb. 14, 2007); Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area; Military
Unsure What Follows Transfer to U.S. Base in Cuba, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at
A1.
38. See Hiromi Yasui, Guantánamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2010,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandpossessions/guantanamobaynavalbasec
uba/index.html; Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/
guantanamo/timeline/ (noting that, on January 11, 2002, the first twenty prisoners from the Afghan
battlefield were transferred to the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base); Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure
Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/11/11/AR2008111102865.html (noting that as of November 2008,
approximately 250 detainees remained at Guantanamo Bay); William Glaberson, 6 at Guantánamo Said
to Face Trial in 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/02/09/us/09gitmo.html (noting that as of February 2008, 275 prisoners remained at the detention
center in Guantánamo Bay, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the “principal planner,” and five
other suspected participants of the attacks on September 11).
39. See Glaberson, supra note 38 (noting that the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay has
been the center of much controversy); Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area; Military
Unsure What Follows Transfer to U.S. Base in Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at A01 (noting that
the Guantánamo Bay detention camp has been referred to as a “gray area”); Jim VandeHei & Josh
White, Guantanamo Bay to Stay Open, Cheney Says, WASH. POST, June 14, 2005, at A06,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/13/AR2005061301
513.html.
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This is because the detention center at Guantánamo Bay is what is known
as a “legal, political[,] and geographical limbo.”40 Indeed, soon after
prisoners were taken to Guantánamo Bay, civil libertarians and some
lawyers well-versed in international law principles claimed that the United
States was required under the Geneva Conventions to hold tribunals to
determine whether these detainees were truly prisoners of war. 41 Other
people believed that the Guantánamo Bay prisoners did not qualify for
prisoner-of-war status because they were unlawful enemy combatants.42
40. Neil A. Lewis, Aftereffects: Prisoners; Detainees from the Afghan War Remain in a Legal
Limbo in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/
24/us/aftereffects-prisoners-detainees-afghan-war-remain-legal-limbo-cuba.html?pagewanted=all. Lewis
reflects on the dilemmas concerning prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay:
[T]he majority of the detainees still face an uncertain future on an island chosen
explicitly for its unusual features. Not only is the base lodged on sovereign territory
of Cuba, a nominally hostile country, and ringed by a 17-mile-long fence with armed
watchtowers on both sides[,] [t]wo federal courts have also said that despite the fact
that it is totally under United States control, the base is outside the reach of United
States law because it is technically part of Cuba. . . . The [primary] criticisms from
the human rights groups that look after such issues have been . . . [aimed at the fact]
that the United States has detained the men indefinitely without any legal rights. . . .
[An Oxford professor and leading authority on the law of war has] said that the
United States might not be obliged to treat them as prisoners of war but that officials
should recognize that they had some international legal rights. “The U.S. has paid a
huge price in international opinion” . . . . “In Britain, people see Guantánamo as a
symbol of American defiance of international norms.” The discussions [about holding
inmates at Guantánamo] have . . . been principally about the nature of the indefinite
detention and the slow pace in releasing detainees against whom there is no evidence
of wrongdoing. . . . Military officials . . . say they must keep the Guantánamo
detainees locked up securely while intelligence personnel mine them for whatever they
might know about terrorist activities[, but w]hat intelligence value they have,
especially after most of them have been isolated here for more than a year, is [also] a
matter of some debate.

Id.

41. Id.; Alan Bock, Guantanamo and Geneva: The Missing Questions, ANTIWAR.COM, Jan.
30, 2002, http://www.antiwar.com/bock/b013002.html (arguing that the United States is obligated by
the Geneva Conventions to afford the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay prisoner-of-war status, and making
the following comment regarding the Geneva Convention: “it very specifically says that if there’s doubt
about the status of somebody detained[,] that person is to be offered all the protections of the
convention until the status is determined by a formal and competent procedure” and arguing that if the
detainees at Guantánamo Bay were determined to truly be prisoners of war, these inmates should have
been released when the combat in Afghanistan stopped unless there is evidence that these detainees
have personally committed war crimes); see RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 53–75
(Geoffrey Stone ed., 2006) (discussing the rights individuals have when detained and placed into
custody by the federal government).
42. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. & John C.
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel for William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction Over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
(Dec. 28, 2001) (asserting the opinion that “a district court cannot properly entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus by an enemy alien detained at Guantanamo Bay”); Lewis, supra note 40
(noting that some people, including the United States Government officials, have argued that
Guantánamo Bay prisoners do not qualify for prisoner-of-war status because they are unlawful enemy
combatants). See generally John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004) (exploring the
international law that governs the use of force in the wake of conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq).
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Indeed, the Department of Defense turned to the Department of Justice’s
Office of Legal Counsel for a legal opinion on this very issue;
specifically, the Department of Defense requested an opinion to establish
the legal standards governing military interrogations of alien unlawful
combatants detained outside of the United States.43

C. The 2003 “Torture Memo”: Significant Findings
On March 13, 2003, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel issued the Torture Memo, setting forth legal standards applicable
to military interrogations of illegal enemy combatants detained outside of
the United States. 44 Prisoners from the Afghanistan battlefield had been
detained at Guantánamo Bay since early 2002, and the Department of
Justice had issued several legal opinions since then on a variety of issues
involving the detention of prisoners. 45 In addition, the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice submitted drafts of the Torture
Memo, while it was being written, to top officials at the Department of
Defense, thereby providing them with a sense of the Memo’s basic
principles before the final version of the Memo was completed. 46
43. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1 (“You have asked our Office to examine the legal
standards governing military interrogations of alien unlawful combatants held outside the United States.
You have requested that we examine both domestic and international law that might be applicable to
the conduct of those interrogations.”); see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Pres. and William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
02.01.22.pdf (finding that Al-Qaeda is a non-government terrorist organization whose members
are not legally entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949); Fact Sheet,
Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2002_02_07_Factsheet_
Status_of_Detainees_at_Guantanamo_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (describing the treatment to
be afforded to detainees held at Guantánamo Bay and the supporting reasoning underlying such
treatment).
44. Torture Memo, supra note 2.
45. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) (memorandum released after the detention facility at Guantánamo
Bay was opened and prisoners began to be transferred there); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
Re: Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (Feb. 7, 2002)
(same); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of
Def., Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf (same); Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: The President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured
Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations (Mar. 13, 2002) (same); Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: Potential Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations of Persons
Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan (Feb. 26, 2002) (same).
46. Exclusive: “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, supra
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Therefore, suffice it to say, the President, the Department of Defense,
and other individuals responsible for establishing policies related to the
treatment of Guantánamo Bay detainees did not need to wait until the
Torture Memo was finished in order to finalize policy decisions regarding
treatment of these Guantánamo Bay prisoners. 47
When the official Torture Memo was issued, it contained several
controversial findings. 48 First, the Memo concluded that the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution do not extend to
alien enemy combatants detained outside of the United States. 49 Second,
the Memo asserted that certain federal criminal statutes do not apply to
properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants.50 Third, the
Memo interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2340A—the statute that makes it a
criminal offense for any person outside of the United States to commit or
attempt to commit torture.51 More specifically, in interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2340A, the Memo concluded that this statute does not apply to
interrogations conducted within the United States or on permanent

note 12. This article, posted on April 3, 2008, summarizes an interview with John Yoo that occurred
approximately the day after the Torture Memo was declassified. In this interview, Yoo stated that
drafts of these memoranda dealing with treatment of detainees were provided to the Department of
Defense officials during the drafting processes, so that officials had “a sense” of the “basic outlines”
before the memoranda were finalized. Id.
47. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. 2340–2340A
(Aug. 1, 2002) (providing guidance regarding 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A); Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Status of
Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (Feb. 7, 2002) (clarifying the
status of members of the Taliban pursuant to the Third Geneva Convention of 1949); Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf (discussing whether the Geneva Convention treaties apply to Al-Qaeda
and Taliban detainees); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: Potential Legal Constraints Applicable to Interrogations
of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan (Feb. 26, 2002) (describing legal standards
governing interrogations of prisoners captured in Afghanistan); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: The President’s
Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign
Nations (Mar. 13, 2002) (discussing the President’s role as Commander in Chief as it relates to
transferring captured terrorists); Exclusive: “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This
Week’s Revelations, supra note 12 (indicating that John Yoo stated that the Department of Justice had
“a sense” of the “basic outlines” of the Torture Memo and thus continued to move forward with
regard to Guantánamo detainees before the Torture Memo was finalized).
48. See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text (indicating the Torture Memo’s significant
findings); supra notes 10–17 (explaining that several of the Torture Memo’s findings have proven to be
controversial); infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (indicating the Torture Memo’s significant
findings).
49. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1–10.
50. Id. at 1, 11–47.
51. Id. at 1, 32–47.
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military bases outside the territory of the United States. 52 Further
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, the Memo defined torture as acts
inflicting severe pain that result in “death, organ failure, or serious
impairment of body functions.”53
When the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued this
Memo to the Department of Defense on March 13, 2003, the Memo was
marked classified and kept secret, thereby avoiding public criticism.54
However, in response to a lawsuit filed in June of 2004 by the ACLU,
the New York Civil Liberties Union, and other organizations attempting
to enforce the Freedom of Information Act, on March 31, 2008, the
Department of Justice voluntarily declassified the Torture Memo and
made it available to the public.55 Since then, perhaps not surprisingly
given the topics it addresses, the Memo has undergone intense scrutiny
and has been widely criticized.56
III. ANALYSIS
To counter the aforementioned criticism that has been directed at the
Torture Memo, this Article analyzes the Torture Memo’s controversial
assertions to show that the underlying legal reasoning posited in the
Memo is sound and that John Yoo did not violate his legal ethical
obligations in authoring the Memo. Accordingly, Part III.A first
examines the Torture Memo’s assertion that the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution do not extend to alien
enemy combatants detained outside of the United States. Part III.B next
considers the Memo’s assertion that certain federal criminal statutes do
not apply to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants.
Finally, Part III.C explores the Memo’s interpretation of § 2340A of
Title 18 of the United States Code—the statute that makes it a crime for
any person outside of the United States to commit or attempt to commit
torture. More specifically, Part III.C.1 considers the Memo’s conclusion
that the statutory prohibition against torture does not apply to
interrogations conducted within the United States or on permanent
military bases outside the territory of the United States. Part III.C.2
evaluates the definition of torture posited in the Memo: acts inflicting
severe pain that result in “death, organ failure, or serious impairment of

52. Id. at 1–2, 32–47.
53. Id. at 39, 1, 36–47.
54. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that the Torture Memo was originally
marked “classified”).
55. See ACLU Press Release, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text (highlighting criticism aimed at the Torture
Memo).
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body functions” constitute torture. 57

A. The Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States
Constitution Do Not Extend to Alien Enemy Combatants Detained
Outside of the United States
The Torture Memo initially places the Department of Defense’s legal
question in its appropriate context by discussing the terrorist attacks of
September 11th as an act of war against the United States, the ongoing
threats of Al-Qaeda attacks, and the President’s power as Commander in
Chief during war times.58 The Memo then concludes that the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution do not extend to
alien enemy combatants detained outside of the United States and puts
forth several reasons to support this conclusion.59
In considering Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the Memo first
asserts that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not apply
to the President’s conduct during a war; second, it asserts that, even if
it did, the Due Process Clause does not apply extraterritorially to
aliens who have no connection to the United States.60 The Memo first
cites an 1865 opinion of the Attorney General, which states that when
a constitutional provision conflicts with the power to carry on war
causing such a significant clash as to make the provision valueless, it
should not apply. 61 The Memo also cites recent case law that further
supports the idea that the Fifth Amendment should not apply to the
capture or detention of enemy combatants during war time.62 For
instance, the Memo adopts the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, decided in
1990 (which concluded that the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution does not apply to governmental actions against
aliens outside the United States), to support the opinion that the Fifth
Amendment similarly does not apply to governmental actions against
enemy aliens detained outside of United States borders:
The United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this
country—over 200 times in our history—for the protection of
57. See Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 38–39 (defining torture).
58. See id. at 2–6.
59. See id. at 1, 6–10.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6–7 (quoting Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 314 (1865) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“If any provisions of the Constitution are so in conflict with the power to
carry on war as to destroy and make it valueless, then the instrument, instead of being a great and wise
one, is a miserable failure, a felo de se.”)).
62. Id. at 7 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
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American citizens or national security. . . . Application of the
Fourth Amendment to those circumstances could significantly disrupt
the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations
involving our national interest. Were respondent to prevail, aliens
with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for
damages to remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in
foreign countries or in international waters . . . . [T]he Court of
Appeals’ global view of [the Fourth Amendment’s] applicability
would plunge [the political branches] into a sea of uncertainty as to
what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures
63
conducted abroad.

The Memo also reasons that the United States Supreme Court has refused
to apply the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to executive actions
taken in war efforts against enemies of the Nation, citing United States v.
Salerno, wherein the Court stated that “in times of war or insurrection,
when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may detain
individuals whom the government believes to be dangerous” without
running afoul of the Due Process Clause.64 Thus, it is well-established
that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the President’s conduct
during war, and thus it does not apply to properly authorized
interrogations of enemy combatants during war.65
63. Id. at 7 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274). “If each time the President captured and
detained enemy aliens outside the United States, those aliens could bring suit challenging the
deprivation of their liberty, such a result would interfere with and undermine the President’s capacity to
protect the Nation and to respond to the exigencies of war.” Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Torture Memo provides the following explanation:
Similarly, as the Supreme Court has explained with respect to enemy property, “[b]y
exertion of the war power, and untrammeled by the due process or just compensation
clause,” Congress may “enact[] laws directing seizure, use, and disposition of
property in this country belonging to subjects of the enemy.” Cummings v. Deutsche
Bank Und Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115, 120 (1937). These authorities of the
federal government during armed conflict were recognized early in the Nation’s
history. Chief Justice Marshall concluded for the Court in 1814 that “war gives to the
sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy
wherever found.” Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122 (1814). See
also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775 (“The resident enemy alien is constitutionally
subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a ‘declared war’
exists.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580, 587 (1952). As the Court
explained in United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926),
Congress is “untrammeled and free to authorize the seizure, use[,] or appropriation of
[enemy] properties without any compensation. . . . There is no constitutional
prohibition against confiscation of enemy properties.” See also White v. Mechs. Sec.
Corp., 269 U.S. 283, 301 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (when U.S. seizes property from an
enemy it may “do with it what it like[s]”).
Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
65. See id. at 9. The Torture Memo additionally acknowledges the Supreme Court’s general
rule asserted in United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887), that the Fifth Amendment
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The Memo then explains that even if the Fifth Amendment applied to
the President’s conduct during a war, it does not apply extraterritorially
to aliens who have no connection to the United States.66 After all, as the
Memo notes, the Supreme Court recently declared in Zadvydas v. Davis,
in 2001, that “[i]t is well established that certain constitutional
protections . . . available to persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.”67 It is not an
unfounded leap then to conclude that the Fifth Amendment does not apply
extraterritorially to aliens who have no connection to the United States,
especially considering the Supreme Court’s discussion in Johnson v.
Eisentrager, in which the Court specifically addressed the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment to aliens who are outside of the United States and
have no connection to the United States. 68 There, the Court said “[t]he
Court of Appeals has cited no authority what[so]ever for holding that the
Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever their
nationality, wherever they are located and whatever their offenses.” 69 The
Torture Memo draws on this case and others to conclude that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply extraterritorially to aliens and notes that the
does not protect against all damage to private property during military operations:
For “[t]he terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive promise that
the United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of
war. This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must be attributed
solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign.” United States v. Caltex, Inc.
(Philippines), 344 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1952). See also Herrera v. United States, 222
U.S. 558 (1912); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909); Ford v.
Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878). These cases and the untenable consequences for the
President’s conduct of a war that would result from the application of the Due Process
Clause demonstrate its inapplicability during wartime—whether to the conduct of
interrogations or the detention of enemy aliens.

Id.

66. Id. at 9. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (“[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens
are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.”).
67. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)).
68. Id. at 9 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950)). In discussing the
Eisentrager holding, the Torture Memo states,
As the Supreme Court explained in Eisentrager, construing the Fifth Amendment to
apply to aliens who are outside the United States and have no connection to the United
States:
would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements,
guerrilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’ could require the American Judiciary
to assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First
Amendment, right to bear arms as in the Second [Amendment], security
against ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures as in the Fourth [Amendment],
as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Such
extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an
innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended,
it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one
word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view.
Id. at 9 (citation omitted) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S at 784).
69. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783 (1950).
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D.C. Circuit has expressly stated as such in a case where U.S. officials
were accused of torturing, during peacetime, a non-U.S. citizen outside
of the United States.70 Accordingly, in determining that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to the President’s conduct during war, the
Torture Memo appropriately bases its reasoning on valid legal sources,
such as opinions of the Attorney General and of the Supreme Court. 71
Moreover, even if the Fifth Amendment applied to the President’s
conduct during a war, it does not apply to the detention of enemy
combatants outside of the United States.72
The Torture Memo also considers whether the Eighth Amendment
applies to the detention of enemy combatants outside of the United States
and determines that it does not.73 The Memo states, “As the Supreme
Court has explained, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause ‘was
designed to protect those convicted of crimes.’ As a result, ‘Eighth
Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with
the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions.’” 74 Indeed, the purposes of detaining an enemy combatant
are to prevent the combatant from serving the enemy and to obtain
intelligence from him, not to punish him.75
Unlike imprisonment pursuant to a criminal sanction, the detention

70. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 9–10 (citing Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 603–04
(D.C. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002)). The Torture
Memo also cites other cases to support its proposition that the Fifth Amendment does not apply
extraterritorially to aliens. Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 n.16 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“The Supreme Court in Eisentrager, Verdugo-Urquidez, and Zadvydas, and the District Court of
Columbia Circuit in Harbury, have all held that there is no extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment to aliens.”)).
71. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
73. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 10.
74. Id. at 10 (citation omitted) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)). For
further support, the Torture Memo cites Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979), noting that
the Bell Court held that the “condition of confinement claims brought by [a] pretrial detainee must be
considered under the Fifth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.” Id. The Memo further reasons:
The Eighth Amendment therefore cannot extend to the detention of wartime
detainees, who have been captured pursuant to the President’s power as Commander
in Chief. See [Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: The
President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the
Control and Custody of Foreign Nations (Mar. 13, 2002)] (concluding that “the
President has since the Founding era exercised exclusive and virtually unfettered
control over the disposition of enemy soldiers and agents captured in time of war”).
See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (the President’s
powers as Commander in Chief “include the authority to detain those captured in
armed struggle”).

Id.

75. Id. at 10 (quoting In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946)) (stating that “[t]he
object of capture is to prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy,” and noting that another
objective of capture is to obtain from captured individuals intelligence that will help in the war efforts).
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of enemy combatants involves no sentence judicially imposed or
legislatively required and those detained will be released at the end
of the conflict. Indeed, it has long been established that “[c]aptivity
[in wartime] is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,” but
“merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all penal
76
character.”

Thus, because prisoner detention is not a form of punishment, the Eighth
Amendment does not apply.77 While the Torture Memo’s discussion of
the Eighth Amendment is fairly brief, it cites relevant and binding United
States Supreme Court case law to adequately support its determination
that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the detention of enemy
combatants outside of the United States.78
Based on the foregoing reasons, to the extent that critics have
condemned the Torture Memo’s assertion that the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments do not apply to alien enemy combatants detained outside of
the United States, their allegations are unsubstantiated. 79

B. Certain Federal Criminal Statutes Do Not Apply to Properly
Authorized Interrogations of Enemy Combatants
Next, the Torture Memo asserts that certain federal criminal statutes
do not apply to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants
and includes several reasons to support this conclusion.80 First, as the
United States Supreme Court stated in Hamilton v. Dillin in 1874,
because “[t]he executive power and the command of the military and
naval forces is vested in the President,” it is “the President alone . . .
who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile
operations.” 81 Complete authority over the conduct of a war is vested in
the President, and a criminal statute does not infringe on this authority
76. Id. at 10 (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (2d ed.
1920)).
77. Id. at 10.
78. See id. at 10 (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the detention of
enemy combatants outside of the United States); supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. See also
Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 10.
79. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Torture Memo’s conclusion
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not apply to the President’s conduct during a war);
supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (explaining the Torture Memo’s determination that even if
the Due Process Clause did apply to the President’s conduct during a war, the Due Process Clause
does not apply extraterritorially to aliens who have no connection to the United States); supra notes 73–
77 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Torture Memo appropriately reasons that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to the detention of enemy combatants outside of the United States).
80. See Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1, 11–32, 32–47.
81. Id. at 11 (quoting Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874)) (emphasis
omitted).
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unless Congress, in the statute’s text, has unambiguously expressed its
intent for the statute to do so.82 This result is based on the canon of
statutory construction that requires statutes to be construed to avoid
constitutional conflicts as long as another reasonable construction may be

82. Id. at 11–12. The Torture Memo discusses textual silence and what may be inferred by
such silence with regard to congressional intent. Id. The Torture Memo states:
We presume that Congress does not seek to provoke a constitutional confrontation
with an equal, coordinate branch of government unless it has unambiguously indicated
its intent to do so. The Supreme Court has recognized, and this Office has adopted, a
canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed in a manner that
avoids constitutional difficulties as long as reasonable alternative construction is
available. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979)) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will
construe [a] statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.”). Cf. United States Assistance to Countries That Shoot
Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 18 Op. O.L.C. 148, 149 (July 14,
1994) (“Shoot Down Opinion”) (requiring “careful examination of each individual
[criminal] statute” before concluding that generally applicable statute applied to the
conduct of U.S. government officials). This canon of construction applies especially
where an act of Congress could be read to encroach upon powers constitutionally
committed to a coordinate branch of government. See, e.g., Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) (citation omitted) (“Out of respect of the
separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find
that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the
[Administrative Procedure Act]. We would require an express statement by Congress
before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his statutory duties to be
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 465–67 (1989) (construing Federal Advisory Committee Act not to
apply to advice given by [the] American Bar Association to the President on judicial
nominations, to avoid potential constitutional question[s] regarding encroachment on
Presidential power to appoint judges).
Id. The Torture Memo continues by specifically addressing the question of whether Congress intended
for general criminal statutes to supersede the President’s power to detain and interrogate enemy
combatants during wartime—a power that arises out of the President’s Commander in Chief authority:
[T]he President’s power to detain and interrogate enemy combatants arises out of his
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. Any construction of criminal laws
that regulated the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to determine the
interrogation and treatment of enemy combatants would raise serious constitutional
questions whether Congress had intruded on the President’s constitutional authority.
Moreover, we do not believe that Congress enacted general criminal provisions such
as the prohibitions against assault, maiming, interstate stalking, and torture pursuant
to any express authority that would allow it to infringe on the President’s
constitutional control over the operation of the Armed Forces in wartime.
Id. at 13. The Torture Memo next draws an analogy to other conduct of the President during wartime
and concludes:
In our view, Congress may no more regulate the President’s ability to detain and
interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop
movements on the battlefield. In fact, the general applicability of these statutes belies
any argument that these statutes apply to persons under direction of the President in
the conduct of war.

Id.
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applied.83 As such, “federal statutes should not be read to interfere with
the executive Branch’s control over foreign affairs unless Congress
specifically and clearly seeks to do so.”84 To support this proposition, the
Torture Memo quotes several Supreme Court cases and legal opinions
issued by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.85 It is
well-established that where Congress has not unambiguously expressed a
83. Id. at 11–12 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will construe [a] statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
84. Id. at 12, 11–13.
85. Id. at 11–13 (quoting Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (“unless
Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”); Japan Whaling Ass’n v.
Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 232–33 (1986) (construing federal statutes to avoid curtailment
of traditional presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–94
(1981) (deference to executive branch is “especially” appropriate “in the area . . . of . . . national
security”); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) (“during war[,] Congress plays a
reduced role in the war effort[,] and the courts generally defer to executive decisions concerning the
conduct of hostilities.”); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: Legal Constraints to Boarding and
Searching Foreign Vessels on the High Seas (June 13, 2002) (rejecting the application of a different
statute to conduct during a war, stating:
[W]e have previously concluded that the President’s authority is very broad, and that
in the absence of a clear statement in the text or context of a statutory prohibition to
suggest . . . Congress’s intent to circumscribe this authority, . . . a statute should
[not] be interpreted to impose such a restriction on the President’s constitutional
powers.);
Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, Re: Swift
Justice Authorization Act (Apr. 8, 2002) (indicating that Congress may not interfere when the
President acts pursuant to his Commander in Chief power in prosecuting a war); Memorandum
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Timothy E.
Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President, Re: The President’s Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm (stating, “[t]he power of the President is at its
zenith under the Constitution when the President is directing military operations of the armed
forces”); Memorandum from Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, Re:
Defense Authorization Act (Sept. 15, 1995) (indicating that Congress may not interfere when the
President acts pursuant to his Commander in Chief power in prosecuting a war); Memorandum
from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Jamie S. Gorelick,
Deputy Attorney Gen., Re: United States Assistance to Countries That Shoot Down Civil
Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 18 Op. O.L.C. 148, 149 (July 14, 1994),
http://www.justice.gov/olc/shootdow.htm (“Unless Congress by a clear and unequivocal
statement declares otherwise,” a criminal statute should not be construed to apply to the properly
authorized acts of the military during armed conflict.); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alan Kreczko, Legal Adviser to the
National Security Council, Re: Applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities
(Oct. 15, 1993) (“In the absence of a clear statement of [the] intent [to apply the statute to
military personnel acting under the President as Commander in Chief], we do not believe that a
statutory provision of this generality should be interpreted so to restrict the President’s
constitutional powers.”). “Courts will not lightly assume that Congress has acted to interfere
with the President’s constitutionally superior position as Chief Executive and Commander in
Chief in the area of military operations.” Id. at 12.
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desire for the statute to infringe on the President’s complete authority
over the conduct of war, such intent should not be inferred.86
Second, a criminal statute of general applicability does not apply to
military conduct during the prosecution of war, and thus does not apply
to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants.87 To support
this assertion, the Torture Memo cites opinions of both the United States
Supreme Court and the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel. 88 The Torture Memo notes that the Egan Court concluded that
“unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally
have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in
military and national security affairs.”89 The Memo further provides
numerous examples of situations in which allowing a criminal statute to
apply to military conduct during war would produce “ridiculous”
results.90 For instance, if criminal statutes of general applicability applied
86. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 11–13; see supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text
(noting the well-established principle that unless Congress has unambiguously expressed a desire for a
statute to infringe on the President’s complete authority over the prosecution of war, such intent should
not be inferred, and citing a variety of sources that were included in the Torture Memo to support this
proposition).
87. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1, 14; Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 232–33
(construing federal statutes to avoid curtailment of traditional presidential prerogatives in foreign
affairs); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (stating that deference to the executive branch is
“especially” appropriate “in the area . . . of . . . national security”); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) at 670 (“[D]uring war[,] Congress plays a reduced role in the war effort[,] and the courts
generally defer to executive decisions concerning the conduct of hostilities.”); Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy
Attorney Gen., Re: United States Assistance to Countries That Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in
Drug Trafficking, 18 Op. O.L.C. 148, 164 (July 14, 1994) (“Unless Congress by a clear and
unequivocal statement declares otherwise,” a criminal statute should not be construed to apply to the
properly authorized acts of the military during armed conflict); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alan Kreczko, Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council, Re: Applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities (Oct. 15, 1993)
(“In the absence of a clear statement of [the] intent [to apply the statute to military personnel acting
under the President as Commander in Chief], we do not believe that a statutory provision of this
generality should be interpreted so to restrict the President’s constitutional powers.”); Application of
the Neutrality Act to Official Government Activities, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58, 81 (1984) (concluding that, in
absence of a clear and unambiguous congressional statement, that the Neutrality Act does not apply to
United States “Government officials acting within the course and scope of their official duties”)).
88. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 14 (citing Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney Gen., Re: United
States Assistance to Countries That Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 148, 149 (July 14, 1994), http://www.justice.gov/olc/shootdow.htm; Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alan Kreczko, Legal Adviser
to the National Security Council, Re: Applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities
(Oct. 15, 1993); Application of the Neutrality Act to Official Government Activities, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58,
81 (1984)); see also Egan, 484 U.S. at 530.
89. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 12, 14 (citing Egan, 484 U.S. at 530).
90. See id. at 14. To illustrate why statutes of general applicability are not construed so as to
apply to the conduct of the military during war, the Torture Memo articulately provides the following
explanation of the “absurdities” that would result if statutes of general applicability were construed to
apply to the conduct of the military during war:
This canon of construction [i.e., that statutes of general applicability are not
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to conduct of military officials during war, a soldier who shoots an
enemy combatant on the battlefield would be liable under general criminal
laws prohibiting assault and murder. 91 Surely, such a result must be
incorrect. In accordance with jurisprudence dealing with congressional
intent, Congress must unambiguously indicate in the text of a statute that
it intends for the statute to apply to the conduct of the United States
military during a war.92 Where Congress has failed to indicate such
intent, a statute does not apply to properly authorized interrogations of
enemy combatants performed by the military during a war. 93
Third, a criminal statute of general applicability does not apply to the
sovereign. 94 Instead, as the United States Supreme Court explained in
United States v. Nardone, the State has historically been exempt from the
operation of general statutes of limitation.95 Applying a statute of general
applicability to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants
would deprive the sovereign of a recognized prerogative. 96 One such
prerogative is the Commander in Chief’s ability to treat unlawful
combatants as desired and without reference to regulatory regime. 97 The
United States Supreme Court recognized this prerogative in Ex Parte
Quirin when it stated, “[b]y universal agreement and practice[,] the law
of war draws a distinction between . . . lawful and unlawful
combatants.”98 Indeed, longstanding historical practice supports the
construed so as to apply to the conduct of the military during war] is rooted in the
absurdities that the application of such laws to the conduct of the military during a
war would create. If those laws were construed to apply to the properly-authorized
conduct of military personnel, the most essential tasks necessary to the conduct of war
would become subject to prosecution. A soldier who shot an enemy combatant on the
battlefield could become liable under the criminal laws for assault or murder; a pilot
who bombed a military target in a city could be prosecuted for murder or destruction
of property; a sailor who detained a suspected terrorist on the high seas might be
subject to prosecution for kidnapping. As we noted in the Shoot Down Opinion, the
application of such laws to the military during wartime “could [also] mean in some
circumstances that military personnel would not be able to engage in reasonable selfdefense without subjecting themselves to the risk of criminal prosecution.” The mere
potential for prosecution could impair the military’s completion of its duties during a
war[,] as military officials [could] bec[o]me concerned about their liability under the
criminal laws. Such results are so ridiculous as to be untenable and must be rejected
to allow the President and the Armed Forces to successfully conduct a war.
Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 14; see supra note 90.
92. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 14; see supra notes 87–89 (discussing that for a statute of
general applicability to apply to the conduct of the United States military during a war, Congress must
unambiguously indicate in the text of the applicable statute that it intends for the statute to apply to the
military during wartime).
93. Torture Memo, supra note 2.
94. Id. at 15–16.
95. Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937)).
96. Id. at 15 (citing Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383).
97. Id. at 15 (citing Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383).
98. Id. at 15 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942) (emphasis omitted)).
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Memo’s proposition that “unlawful belligerents are ‘[n]ot . . . within the
protection of the laws of war.’” 99 Given this authority, construing a
criminal law of general applicability to require the United States to treat
enemy combatants according to particular standards would contradict the
well-established prerogative of the sovereign. 100
In addition, applying a statute of general applicability to a
government official performing properly authorized interrogations of
enemy combatants would create absurd results, such as effectively
preventing the official from carrying out his official duties.101 A long line
of United States Supreme Court cases has determined that prohibitory
laws do not apply to a government official performing a necessary public
99. Id. (quoting William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 784 (2d ed. 1920)); id.
at 15–16 (citing R.C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War 18 (1982) (emphasis omitted) (“[U]nlawful
belligerents are ‘more often than not treated as war or national criminals liable to be treated at will by
the captor. There are almost no regulatory safeguards with respect to them[,] and the captor owes no
obligation towards them.’”)); Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 148 (2d ed. 2000) (“Unlawful
combatants . . . enjoy no protection under international law); A. Berriedale Keith, 2 Wheaton’s
Elements of International Law 716 (6th ed. 1929) (“irregular bands of marauders are . . . not entitled
to the protection of the migrated usages of war as practised [sic] by civilized nations”); L. Oppenheim,
2 International Law, § 254, at 454 (6th ed. 1944) (“Private individuals who take up arms and commit
hostilities against the enemy do not enjoy the privileges of armed forces, and the enemy has, according
to a customary rule of International Law, the right to treat such individuals as war criminals.”)).
100. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 15. The Torture Memo acknowledges that the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949 includes specific criteria for the treatment of prisoners of war, but
furthermore notes that unlawful combatants are not entitled to prisoner of war status. Id. at 1, 15
(citing Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan.
22, 2002), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf).
101. Id. at 16. The Torture Memo explains that applying statutes of general applicability to the
properly authorized interrogations of unlawful combatants is inappropriate because
the application of general laws to a government official would create absurd results,
such as effectively preventing the official from carrying out his duties. In Nardone,
the Supreme Court pointed to “the application of a speed law to a policeman pursuing
a criminal or the driver of a fire engine responding to an alarm” as examples of such
absurd results. [United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937)]. See also
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486–87 (1868) (holding that a statute
punishing obstruction of mail did not apply to an officer’s temporary detention of mail
caused by his arrest of the carrier for murder). In those situations and others, such as
undercover investigations of narcotics trafficking, the government officer’s conduct
would constitute a literal violation of the law. And while “[g]overnment law
enforcement efforts frequently require the literal violation of facially applicable
statutes[,] . . . courts have construed prohibitory laws as inapplicable when a public
official is engaged in the performance of a necessary public duty.” Memorandum
[from Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to]
Maurice C. Inman, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Re:
Visa Fraud Investigation at 2 (Nov. 20, 1984). Indeed, to construe such statutes
otherwise[,] would undermine almost all undercover investigative efforts. See also
id. . . . [t]he application of these general laws to the conduct of the military during
the course of a war would create untenable results.

Id.
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duty.102 To be sure, to decide otherwise would result in, for example,
holding a police officer liable for vehicular speeding when pursuing a
criminal, or holding a firefighter liable for speeding when driving a fire
engine in excess of the speed limit in response to a fire alarm.103 In both
cases, the policeman and the fireman are charged with definite public
duties in defense of the public. Holding them responsible for “the literal
violation of facially applicable statutes” while in pursuit of their public
duties would countermand their original charge.104 For this reason, in
such instances, a criminal statute of general applicability does not apply to
the sovereign. 105 By extension, in cases involving properly authorized
interrogations of enemy combatants, criminal statutes of general
applicability do not apply to the sovereign. 106 The sovereign retains the
prerogative to determine the type of treatment used in these
interrogations, and military government officials are not hindered in
carrying out their official public duties.107
Fourth, a criminal statute of general applicability does not apply
where another more specific statute has been enacted. 108 This proposition
is well-established in American jurisprudence and employed in Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., where the Court stated that “[w]here
there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of the
enactment.”109 As such, because Congress enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (the “UCMJ”), which explicitly governs the conduct of
the military during a war, general federal criminal laws do not apply
(generally) to the conduct of the military during a war and therefore do
not apply (specifically) to properly authorized interrogations of enemy
combatants during a war.110 Specifically, the UCMJ provides that “[n]o
prosecution may be commenced against a member of the Armed Forces
102. See id. at 16 (citing Nardone, 302 U.S. 379; Kirby, 74 U.S. at 486–87); Memorandum
from Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Maurice C.
Inman, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Re: Visa Fraud Investigation at 2
(Nov. 20, 1984).
103. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 16; see supra note 102 (quoting the Torture Memo).
104. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 16 (quoting Memorandum from Larry L. Simms,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Maurice C. Inman, Jr., Gen.
Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Re: Visa Fraud Investigation at 2 (Nov. 20,
1984)).
105. Id.
106. Id. (analogizing to other situations in which applying statutes of general applicability to
government officials carrying out their official duties leads to untenable results).
107. Id. at 15–16.
108. Id. at 17 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987))
(“Where a specific statute or statutory scheme has been enacted, it and not a more general
enactment will govern.”).
109. Crawford Fitting Co., 482 U.S. at 445.
110. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1, 17.
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subject to [the UCMJ]” unless the member is no longer a member of the
Armed Forces or the offense involves another defendant who is not
subject to the UCMJ.111 Additionally, the UCMJ specifies that any
member of the Armed Forces that commits a felony will be punished, as
provided, for that offense.112 Because these statutory provisions
specifically govern the treatment of offending Armed Forces members,
they supersede general federal criminal laws when dealing with the
conduct of military personnel during wartime.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, criticism condemning the
Torture Memo’s assertion that certain federal criminal laws do not apply
to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants is wholly
unsubstantiated.113

C. Examining 18 U.S.C. § 2340A
Finally, the Torture Memo interprets 18 U.S.C. § 2340A—the statute
that makes it a criminal offense for any person outside of the United
States to commit or attempt to commit torture.114 First, the Memo
concludes that this statute does not apply to interrogations conducted
within the United States or on permanent military bases outside the
territory of the United States.115 Second, and perhaps most
controversially, the Memo defines torture as acts inflicting severe pain
that result in “death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body
functions.”116 Each assertion is considered in turn. 117

111. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d) (2006).
112. Id. § 3261(a).
113. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text (discussing that unless Congress
unambiguously expresses a desire for a statute to infringe on the President’s constitutionally dominant
position as Commander in Chief with authority over the prosecution of war, such intent should not be
inferred); supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text (discussing that a criminal statute of general
applicability does not apply to military conduct during the prosecution of a war, and thus does not
apply to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants); supra notes 94–108 and
accompanying text (discussing why a criminal statute of general applicability does not apply to the
sovereign); supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text (explaining that criminal statutes of general
applicability do not apply to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants during a war
because Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which explicitly governs the conduct
of the military during a war).
114. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1, 32–47.
115. Id. at 1–2, 32–47.
116. Id. at 1, 38–47.
117. See infra Parts III.C.1–2.
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1. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A’s prohibition against torture does not apply to
interrogations conducted within the United States or on permanent
military bases outside the territory of the United States
First, the Torture Memo asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 2340A—the
criminal statutory prohibition against torture—does not apply to
interrogations conducted within the United States or on permanent
military bases outside the territory of the United States and considers the
text of the statute itself to support this conclusion.118 Section 2340A of
Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a criminal offense for a
person “outside the United States [to] commit[] or attempt[] to commit
torture.” 119 The statute further defines “United States” as “all areas
under the jurisdiction of the United States including any of the places
described in” §§ 5 and 7 of Title 18 of the Code. 120 The Torture Memo
thus correctly concludes that enemy combatants detained at Guantánamo
Bay Naval Base are not “within the United States,” pursuant to this
statute’s definition.121 The Memo further clarifies an important distinction
drawn in the statute: although interrogations performed at Guantánamo
Bay are not subject to the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A,
interrogations conducted outside the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction and that are otherwise outside the United States, such as at a
non-United States base in Afghanistan, are subject to these
prohibitions. 122 Even though this particular assertion from the Torture
Memo has not received wide-scale criticism, it is explained here as a way
of introducing the Memo’s interpretation of what is meant by “torture”
pursuant to this statute—an interpretation that has been widely criticized
as being unfounded. 123

118. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1–2, 36.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2000).
120. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (“The term ‘United States,’ as used in this title in a territorial
sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, except the Canal Zone.”); see 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States); see also Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 34 n.42
(concluding that “the persons discussed in this memorandum are not within United States as it is
defined in section 5”).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000); Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 34–35.
122. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 34–35 (“[I]nterrogations conducted at a non-U.S. base in
Afghanistan would be subject to section 2340A.”). Specifically, the Torture Memo explains that when
interrogations occur “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, such as at a U.S. military
base in a foreign state, the interrogations are not subject to sections 2340–2340A.” Id. at 34–35
(emphasis added). If, however, the interrogations occur “outside the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction and are otherwise outside the United States, the torture statute applies.” Id. at 35.
123. See id. at 35–36 (concluding that enemy combatants detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval
Base are not within the United States, pursuant to the statutory definition of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A); infra
Part III.C.2 (discussing the Torture Memo’s interpretation of what is meant by torture pursuant to this
statute—an interpretation that has been widely criticized).
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2. Torture includes acts inflicting severe pain that result in “death,
organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions”
Perhaps the most controversial and often-criticized assertion posited
in the Torture Memo, the Memo defines torture as acts inflicting severe
pain that result in “death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body
functions.”124 Although this definition has received significant criticism,
to the extent that critics have alleged that this definition is unfounded,
these allegations are completely unsubstantiated.125 On the contrary, to
124. See Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 39, 36–47 (defining “torture”). Some
commentators have asserted that the mere fact that another memorandum on which the (2003)
Torture Memo relied in defining “severe pain” was later rescinded (i.e., the August 2002 OLC
memorandum was rescinded) implies that the (2003) Torture Memo was based on unsound legal
principles, suggesting, by innuendo, that the mere fact that another memorandum on which the
(2003) Torture Memo relied was rescinded implies that the (2003) Torture Memo was
misguided, improper, or carelessly drafted. See, e.g., Washington Monthly, The Torture Memo
(Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2008_04/013450.php
(stating, “As we all know, this memo was eventually rescinded.” ). See Memorandum from
Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Deputy Attorney
Gen., Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.SC §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2 (“This opinion interprets the federal criminal
prohibition against torture codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. It supersedes in its entirety
the August 1, 2002 opinion of this Office entitled Standards of Conduct under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340–2340A.”).
See also Richardson supra note 16. To be sure, the fact that the August 2002 OLC
memorandum was rescinded does little to support the contention that John Yoo violated his legal
ethical obligations in authoring the (2003) Torture Memo. Id. Instead, in defining torture, the
2004 OLC memorandum, although it superseded the 2002 OLC memorandum, followed an
approach similar to the approach followed in the (2003) Torture Memo. See Memorandum from
Daniel Levin, supra; Torture Memo, supra note 2. Both the 2004 OLC memorandum and the
(2003) Torture Memo acknowledge the difficulty of the task of defining precisely what is meant
by “torture” as it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A because the statutory terms are not precisely
defined in the statute. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, supra; Torture Memo, supra note 2. In
addition, both memoranda consider the ordinary or natural meaning of “severe pain” by looking
to how dictionaries define “severe.” Memorandum from Daniel Levin, supra; Torture Memo,
supra note 2. Finally, both memoranda also consider judicial interpretations of “torture” as the
term is used in the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.SC. § 1350 (2000). Memorandum from
Daniel Levin, supra; Torture Memo, supra note 2. The 2004 OLC memorandum merely retracts
two statements included in the (2003) Torture Memo, concluding instead as follows: “severe”
pain is not limited to “excruciating and agonizing” pain, nor is it limited to pain associated with
“organ failure, impairment of body functions, or death.” Memorandum from Daniel Levin,
supra; Torture Memo, supra note 2.
In authoring and signing the (2003) Torture Memo, John Yoo had a difficult assignment—to
define as best as possible the limits of acceptable pain as it relates to detaining unlawful enemy
combatants outside of the United States. Richardson supra note 16. Yoo evaluated the issue and
relied on relevant information and valid legal resources available to him at the time (including
the August 2002 OLC memorandum) in rendering a legal opinion regarding the definition of
torture. Id. He responded diligently and should not now be criticized because other people
subsequently rendered a different legal opinion clarifying the meaning of torture as the term is
used in 18 U.S.C § 2340A. Id. The fact that two different conclusions were rendered does not
support the allegation that John Yoo violated his ethical duties as a lawyer. See id.
125. See Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 39, 36–47; Richardson, supra note 16.
Richardson acknowledged that John Yoo was asked to answer a tough question—what activities
constitute torture and what is meant by severe pain? Richardson, supra note 16. Richardson
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support its interpretation of the statute’s definition of torture, the Memo
includes lawyerly analysis based on law and fact and sometimes the
telling absence of both.126 Indeed, the Memo acknowledges from the start
that no prosecutions have been brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, and
therefore, no judicial interpretations are available to ascertain the statute’s
meaning of “torture.”127 In such a situation, when a statute does not
define a key term at issue and courts have not yet interpreted the term
within its statutory context, what then is a lawyer trained to do? The
answer is almost so basic as to not even address it in this scholarly
Article. Still, because critics have apparently failed to recognize the
obvious role of a lawyer who finds himself in these circumstances, this
Article would be remiss if it did not discuss this point.
A lawyer—whether serving as a judge, in-house counsel, or in
another capacity—faced with the task of interpreting a term in a statute
must first consider the text of the statute.128 But, if the statute is silent,
the lawyer should then consider how various courts have defined the term
within the same statutory context.129 When no judicial interpretations are
framed the issue in its proper perspective: maybe John Yoo did not violate his ethical obligations
as a lawyer; the questions he was asked are just tough questions that, after all, still have not been
answered. Id. Richardson continued:
So what is severe pain? We asked John Yoo, and he drew the line for us, and now he
is tainted in our eyes, rendered unclean by his contact with the unspeakable. . . . But,
if you read the thousands of essays and books and blogs that rage against him, you
will find very few that give a satisfactory answer to the question Yoo was asked. How
would you define severe pain? If thousands of lives are at stake and time is of the
essence? Would you allow sleep manipulation? Heat and cold? Isolation? Hunger? I
asked Jose Padilla’s lawyer three times. Where would you draw the line, Mr.
Freiman? He dodged it twice. The third time he said outright, “I’m not going to draw
that line for you. But I’ll tell you where I would have looked—I would have first
looked at the Constitution to see what was permissible, then I would have looked at
the Geneva Conventions. . . .” So, we still don’t have an answer to the question.
Id. Indeed, in defining “severe pain” in the Torture Memo, John Yoo appropriately looked to
dictionaries, the Constitution, and the Geneva Conventions, among other sources. See id.; see
also supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy that the Torture Memo
has spawned since it was declassified and made available to the public in April 2008); see
discussion infra Part III.C.2 (explaining that allegations that the Torture Memo’s definition of
torture is unfounded are unsubstantiated).
126. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 36–37.
127. Id. at 36.
128. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“[W]e construe [the] term in accordance
with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)
(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) (“[I]n all cases involving statutory
construction, ‘our starting point must be the language employed by Congress . . . .’”)); Memorandum
from Daniel Levin, supra note 124; Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 38 (citing INS v. Phinpathya, 464
U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (noting that when considering the meaning of a term in a statute, the text of the
statute should be examined and should be the “starting point” in such analysis, and in determining what
meaning to attribute to “torture” as it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, it is appropriate to consider the
ordinary and necessary meaning of the word “torture” and also the context surrounding the enactment
of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A)).
129. See Am. Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 68 (indicating that after considering the plain
meaning of a statutory term, it is appropriate to consider how courts have defined the term);
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available, what next? It is well-established that a lawyer should then look
to the legislative history of the statute, judicial interpretations of similar
statutes, and judicial interpretations of the same term in other statutes. 130
This is what lawyers do. As a matter of fact, a mere cursory review of
United States Supreme Court opinions in which the Court has been asked
to interpret a term in a statute illustrates this well-established modus
operandi. 131 Indeed, lawyers have long followed this approach.
The Torture Memo very closely follows this well-accepted
methodology in interpreting the meaning of “torture” within the context
of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. Specifically, the Memo first sets forth the
definition of torture, as included in § 2340:
“torture” [i]s an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain
or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
132
control.

Drawing from its previous conclusion that § 2340A’s criminal prohibition
against torture applies only to interrogations conducted outside of the
United States, the Memo next identifies the elements that the prosecution
must demonstrate to establish an offense of torture under the statute:
(1) the torture occurred outside the United States; (2) the defendant
acted under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the
defendant’s custody or physical control; (4) the defendant specifically
intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering; and
(5) . . . the act inflicted severe physical or mental pain or
133
suffering.

Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that when considering the meaning of a term in a
statute, where the statute does not define the term, it is appropriate to examine how courts have
defined the term within the context of the statute).
130. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 71 (indicating that a statute’s legislative history is
one indicator as to the meaning of a term contained in the statute); West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100, 101 n.7 (1991) (indicating that where the statute itself and corresponding
case law fail to define a term within the statute, a court should consider the meaning that has been
attributed to the term because “[a court’s] role is to say what the law, as hitherto enacted, is; not to
forecast what the law, as amended, will be”); see Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 36, 38 (noting that
when considering the meaning of a term in a statute, where the statute does not define the term and
courts have not interpreted the meaning of the term within the context of the statute, it is appropriate to
look to the statute’s legislative history and judicial interpretations of similar statutes and judicial
interpretations of the same term in other statutes).
131. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text (discussion).
132. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 36 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1)).
133. Id. at 36.
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The Memo acknowledges that the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A provides a
“starting point” for determining the statute’s meaning of torture, but
points out that the statute unfortunately fails to define several key
statutory phrases employed in the statutory definition of torture. 134 For
instance, a critical component of the statute’s definition of torture
states that an act amounts to torture if it causes “severe physical or
mental pain or suffering,” but the statute does not define “severe.”135
The Memo explains that no prosecutions have been brought under this
particular statute; therefore, no case law exists to clarify the precise
meaning of the statutory terms defining torture.136 The Memo thus
proceeds to construe the meaning of key terms employed in the statutory
definition of torture by considering how dictionaries have defined the
terms, how Congress has defined the terms elsewhere in the U.S. Code,
and how the United States Supreme Court has defined the terms within
the context of different statutes.137 The Memo examines “the language
134. Id. at 38 (citing INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 36.
137. Id. at 36–47. In interpreting what is meant by “severe . . . pain” in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A,
the Torture Memo considered the definition of “severe” contained in three different dictionaries—
Webster’s New International Dictionary, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, and
IX The Oxford English Dictionary. See also Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 38–39.
Congress’s use of the phrase “severe pain” elsewhere in the U.S. Code can shed
more light on its meaning. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83, 100 (1991) . . . . Significantly, the phrase “severe pain” appears in statutes
defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (2000); Id. § 1395x
(2000); Id. § 1395dd (2000); Id. § 1396b (2000); Id. § 1396u-2 (2000). These statutes
define an emergency condition as one “manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent lay person, who
possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine, could reasonably expect the
absence of immediate medical attention to result in—placing the health of the
individual . . . (i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment of bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.” Id. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B)
(emphasis added). Although these statutes address a substantially different subject
from section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for understanding what constitutes
severe physical pain. They treat severe pain as an indicator of ailments that are likely
to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence of immediate
medical treatment. Such damage must rise to a level of death, organ failure, or the
permanent impairment of a significant body function. These statutes suggest that to
constitute torture[,] “severe pain” must rise to a similarly high level—the level that
would ordinarily be associated with a physical condition or injury sufficiently serious
that it would result in death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions.
Id. This discussion highlights several aspects of legal analysis contained in the Torture Memo. Id.
First, it shows that the Memo’s authors had a basis for turning to other statutory provisions of the
United States Code for guidance in ascertaining the meaning of “severe . . . pain.” See id. (citing West
Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991)). Second, it shows that the Memo’s authors
acknowledged that the statutory provisions relied on to ascertain the meaning of “severe pain” are from
a different subject from § 2340, but are nonetheless at least “helpful for understanding” what is meant
by “severe . . . pain” in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. See id. Finally, the above passage from the Torture
Memo shows that the authors of the Memo fully acknowledged that no clear cut answer existed as to
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and design of the statute as a whole” to ascertain the statute’s meaning of
torture, and then concludes that “[e]ach component of the definition
emphasizes that torture . . . [requires the infliction of] intense pain or
suffering.”138 The Memo also considers the legislative history of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A in ascertaining the meaning of torture, noting
that it is “scant” and that “[n]either the definition of torture nor these
[statutory] sections as a whole sparked any debate[ among the members
of Congress].”139 The Memo finally reviews the judicial interpretation of
a statute closely related to 18 U.S.C § 2340A—the Torture Victims
Protection Act—to ascertain the meaning of the word “torture” as it is
used in 18 U.S.C § 2340A. 140
what type of conduct constitutes torture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2340A; indeed, they used phrases like
“[t]hese statutes suggest” to preface their legal conclusions. See id. (emphasis added). Sometimes all a
lawyer can do, in the absence of a clear statutory definition of a term and in the absence of judicial
interpretations of the term within the context of the relevant statute, is look to other sources to make an
educated determination as to what the term means, i.e., to determine, based on the most relevant
sources available, what a term means or how a court would likely define the term. See id.
138. Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 44, 44–45.
139. Id. at 45.
The legislative history of sections 2340–2340A is scant. Neither the definition of
torture nor these sections as a whole sparked any debate. Congress criminalized this
conduct to fulfill U.S. obligations under CAT, which requires signatories to “ensure
that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law.” CAT art. 4. Sections
2340–2340A appeared only in the Senate version of the Foreign Affairs Authorization
Act, and the conference bill adopted them without amendment. See H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 103-482, at 229 (1994). The only light that the legislative history sheds reinforces

what is obvious from the texts of section 2340 and CAT: Congress intended Section
2340’s definition of torture to track the definition set forth in CAT, as elucidated by
the United States’ reservations, understandings, and declarations submitted as part of
its ratification. See S. REP. NO. 103-107, at 58 (1993) (“The definition of torture
emanates directly from article 1 of the Convention.”); Id. at 58–59 (“The definition

for ‘severe mental pain and suffering’ incorporates the understanding made by the
Senate concerning this term.”).
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 45–47 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (2000)). Like 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, Congress
intended for the definition of “torture” in the Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) to follow
closely the definition in CAT, id. at 45–46 (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176 n.12
(D. Mass. 1995)), and TVPA’s definition of “torture” differed from section 2340’s definition of
“torture” in only two respects. Id. For these reasons, looking to the TVPA for guidance in interpreting
the meaning of “torture” in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A was reasonable. See id. 46–47. After reviewing
judicial determinations brought under the TVPA, the Torture Memo concluded, “In suits brought
under the TVPA, courts have not engaged in any lengthy analysis of which acts constitute torture. . . .
Nonetheless, courts appear to look at the entire course of conduct rather than any one act, making it
somewhat akin to a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” Id. at 47. See also Richardson, supra note
16. The two statutes using the term “severe” to describe pain deal with two different subjects: health
care and interrogation. Id. “But it’s still the closest you can get to any definition of that phrase at all.”
Id. Thus, considering how the term is defined in the TVPA is appropriate. Id. Based on cases brought
in the context of the VTPA, the Torture Memo states:
[I]t is difficult to take a specific act out of context and conclude that the act in
isolation would constitute torture. Certain acts do, however, consistently reappear in
these cases or are of such a barbaric nature, that it is likely a court would find that
allegations of such treatment would constitute torture: (1) severe beatings using
instruments such as iron barks, truncheons, and clubs; (2) threats of imminent death,
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Yet, notwithstanding that the Torture Memo adheres to this wellestablished methodology in interpreting what is meant by “torture” in 18
U.S.C § 2340A, critics have denigrated how the Memo defines torture. 141
It seems they do so because they disapprove of the definition, regardless
of the approach followed in reaching this definition. 142 But disparaging
the Torture Memo because its conclusions are disagreeable amounts to
merely expressing an opinion about the topics discussed in the Memo,
which is far from asserting a legally principled argument that the Memo
is unfounded. 143 Many legal topics provoke criticism.144 This is nothing
new. Torture joins the ranks of all sorts of topics like abortion, capital
punishment, and assisted suicide—subjects which evoke very strong
feelings in people.145 But, to the extent that critics have claimed that John
Yoo violated his legal ethical obligations in authoring the Memo and,
specifically, in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2340A to define torture

such as mock executions; (3) threats of removing extremities; (4) burning, especially
burning with cigarettes; (5) electric shocks to genitalia or threats to do so; (6) rape or
sexual assault, or injury to an individual’s sexual organs, or threatening to do any of
these sorts of acts; and (7) forcing the prisoner to watch the torture of others.
Torture Memo, supra note 1, at 47 (emphasis added). Torture is by no means limited to these
examples, but the Memo provides these examples as a way of illustrating which acts a court would
likely find rise to “torture” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. Id. See also infra notes 141–47 (noting
that people may not like the end result reached in the Torture Memo with regard to how “torture” is
defined, but that should not reflect negatively on the lawyer-author of the Memo).
Even the 2004 OLC memorandum that superseded the August 2002 OLC memorandum defining
severe pain as the term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A considered judicial interpretations of “torture” in
the context of the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.SC. § 1350 (2000). See Memorandum from
Daniel Levin, supra note 124.
141. See Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 36–47; ACLU Press Release, supra note 9 (broadly
criticizing the Torture Memo for defining torture extremely narrowly); supra notes 10–17 and
accompanying text.
142. See Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 36–47.
143. See Richardson, supra note 16. Richardson explained that Jose Padilla’s lawyer, Mr.
Freiman, criticized Yoo’s work on the Torture Memo, stating that Yoo should have looked to the
Eighth Amendment in answering the question at issue in the Memo. Id. But Yoo did look to the Eighth
Amendment and determined that it did not apply because the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment, and punishment comes only after a criminal conviction. Id. Yoo cited several
valid legal sources to support this conclusion. See id. Some areas of the law are simply grey areas, and
this is one of them. See id. Yoo reached a different conclusion than some people now say they would
have, but that does not mean he breached his ethical duties as a lawyer.
144. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–53 (1992) (concerning a
woman’s right to choose an abortion before fetal viability). Discussing the importance of two principles
significant in the American legal system, stare decisis and judicial restraint, the Casey opinion notes
that judicial opinions are supposed to be based on what the current law is, not on what individual
judges think the law should be. Id.
145. See, e.g., id. (involving the constitutionality of an abortion statute); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Mental Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (involving the constitutionality of an assisted suicide
statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (involving the constitutionality of a capital punishment
statute, and holding, in part, that a penalty of death for commission of the crime of murder is not
unconstitutional in all circumstances); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (involving a statute that
called for capital punishment by way of electrocution).
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narrowly, critics have gone too far.146 They may disagree with the
current state of the law, how the current applicable statute defines torture,
whether the United States should have authorized the use of advanced
interrogation techniques with regard to interrogating enemy combatants at
Guantánamo Bay, and a host of topics related to the Government’s
proclaimed War on Terrorism, but this does not justify allegations that
the Torture Memo has “no foundation,” nor does it justify personal
attacks directed at John Yoo, the Memo’s signatory.147
The Torture Memo properly cites an assortment of valid legal sources
to support its conclusions and is replete with scholastic, critical
analysis.148 In summary, John Yoo did not violate his ethical obligations
as a lawyer in authoring the Torture Memo. 149
IV. CONCLUSION
In March 2003, the United States Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel issued a legal memorandum to the Department of Defense
in response to the Department of Defense’s request for a legal opinion
regarding the legal standards governing military interrogations of alien
unlawful combatants detained outside of the United States. This
memorandum—the Torture Memo, as it has been called—rendered
several highly controversial legal conclusions. First, the Memo concluded
that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution
do not extend to alien enemy combatants detained outside of the United
146. See supra Part III (analyzing the Torture Memo and the legal analysis contained therein).
147. Gillers, supra note 12 (criticizing the Torture Memo for having “no foundation” in any
“source of law” and containing “one-sided legal arguments”); see Exclusive:”Torture Memo” Author
John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, supra note 12. When John Yoo was asked if he felt
badly for the people who might be injured as a result of the legal opinion he gave, he explained that a
“clear line” is better for those actually carrying out these interrogations than the vague standard that
resulted after the 2004 OLC Memo superseded the Torture Memo. Id. He went on to say that some
people think the “words [in the Torture Memo] are shocking because they’re too clear . . . . But . . .
part of the job . . . of being a lawyer sometimes is you have to draw those lines . . . . I could have
written it in a much more palatable way, but it would have been vague.” Id. Richardson, supra note 16
(noting that some people believe that torture should be illegal because it “violates the very premise of
the legal system itself,” and explaining that John Yoo has noted that in writing the Torture Memo he
looked at what the law was; he was tasked with answering the legal question, not determining what
policy the government should adopt); supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text.
148. See Exclusive: “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations,
supra note 12 (noting that the Torture Memo was subjected to the typical process to which legal
opinions by the Department of Justice are subjected—it was reviewed and edited by a number of career
officials at the Department of Justice before it was finalized and released; the Memo was not a
“slapdash” work product as Jack Goldsmith has suggested); supra Part III (describing the assertions in
the Torture Memo that have been widely criticized and indicating the variety of sources cited in the
Memo upon which its assertions are based).
149. See supra Part III (analyzing the aspects of the Torture Memo that have been criticized and
showing why the analysis contained in the Torture Memo is sound legal analysis); see also
Exclusive:”Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations, supra note 12.
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States. Second, the Memo concluded that certain federal criminal statutes
do not apply to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants.
Third, the Memo concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 2340A does not apply to
interrogations conducted within the United States or on permanent
military bases outside the territory of the United States. Finally, the
Memo concluded that for an act to amount to torture under 18 U.S.C. §
2340A, it must inflict severe pain that results in “death, organ failure, or
serious impairment of body functions.”
At the time it was originally issued to the Department of Defense, the
Torture Memo was classified information. When it was later made
available to the public in April 2008, it was widely criticized. This is not
terribly surprising, given the issues discussed in the Memo. However, to
the extent that people have asserted that the Torture Memo was
completely void of legal foundation and that John Yoo, the Memo’s
signatory, should be liable for breaching his lawyerly ethical obligations,
these people have exaggerated the facts. As this Article demonstrates,
John Yoo did not violate his ethical obligations as a lawyer in authoring
the Torture Memo. Rather, he authored a thorough, well-founded legal
memorandum, supported by a wide variety of valid legal sources,
including opinions of the United States Supreme Court. He should not be
condemned for authoring a memorandum which happened to contain
unpopular legal conclusions.

